Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:41 pm
Time: 11:41 pm
Results for private prisons
39 results foundAuthor: Victoria. Auditor-General Title: Management of Prison Accommodation Using Public Private Partnerships Summary: Since 1996, the private sector has become increasingly involved in owning, operating and managing prisons through public private partnerships (PPP). A PPP is a long-term partnership between the public and private sectors to deliver a major capital asset and/or services. The Department of Justice (DOJ) manages several PPP contracts. When the Port Phillip Prison and Fulham Correctional Centre opened in 1997 the Infrastructure Investment Policy for Victoria (1994) applied. The Metropolitan Remand Centre and Marngoneet Correctional Centre contracts were signed in 2003 under a new policy adopted in 2001 called the Partnerships Victoria Framework. The new Ararat Prison contract was signed in 2010 under a later iteration of this framework, one that complies with the Infrastructure Australia National Guidelines (2008). As two of these PPP prison contracts date back more than 10 years, it is timely to review the operational phase of such long-term contracts. This audit evaluated whether the state is managing PPP prison accommodation services well, whether the services are meeting appropriate standards and whether value-for-money and appropriate risk allocation has been maintained. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer, 2010. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 13, 2011 at: http://download.audit.vic.gov.au/files/20101509_Prisons_full_report.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://download.audit.vic.gov.au/files/20101509_Prisons_full_report.pdf Shelf Number: 121329 Keywords: Correctional Administration (Australia)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Justice Policy Institute Title: Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison Companies Promote Ineffective Incarceration Policies Summary: At a time when many policymakers are looking at criminal and juvenile justice reforms that would safely shrink the size of our prison population, the existence of private prison companies creates a countervailing interest in preserving the current approach to criminal justice and increasing the use of incarceration. While private prison companies may try to present themselves as just meeting existing demand for prison beds and responding to current market conditions, in fact they have worked hard over the past decade to create markets for their product. As revenues of private prison companies have grown over the past decade, the companies have had more resources with which to build political power, and they have used this power to promote policies that lead to higher rates of incarceration. For-profit private prison companies primarily use three strategies to influence policy: lobbying, direct campaign contributions, and building relationships, networks, and associations. As policymakers and the public are increasingly coming to understand that incarceration is not only breaking the bank, but it’s also not making us safer, will this shrink the influence of private prison companies? Or will they use their growing financial muscle to consolidate and expand into even more areas of the justice system? Much will depend on the extent that people understand the role for-profit private prison companies have already played in raising incarceration rates and harming people and communities, and take steps to ensure that in the future, community safety and well-being, and not profits, drive our justice policies. One thing is certain: in this political game, the private prison industry will look out for their own interests. Details: Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 21, 2011 at: http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf Shelf Number: 121967 Keywords: PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Isaacs, Caroline Title: Private Prisons: The Public's Problem - A Quality Assessment of Arizona's Private Prisons Summary: Arizona has enthusiastically embraced prison privatization, with 13% of the state prison population housed in private facilities (the 11th highest percentage in the nation). Motivated by a belief that private enterprise could build and manage prisons safely and at lower cost than the state, the legislature has mandated construction of thousands of private prison beds. Little was done over the years to test actual performance of private prisons or to determine their cost effectiveness. In the summer of 2010, three inmates escaped from the privately operated Kingman prison, killed two people, and shattered the myth that private prisons can keep us safe. Since that time, more evidence has come to light unmasking the truth about the private prison industry in Arizona: It is costly, plagued by security problems, and in some cases is violating state and federal law. State leaders have failed in their responsibility to protect the public, to provide adequate oversight of this industry, or to hold the corporations accountable for their failures. This report is the first of its kind in Arizona. To date, no independent analysis of the performance and quality of all private and public prisons has been undertaken. Such an analysis is long overdue, given that private prisons have operated in Arizona for decades, and the state has invested billions of taxpayer dollars into this industry. The people of Arizona have had little or no evidence that these prisons are safe, cost effective, or competent at fulfilling the job taxpayers pay them to do. When AFSC learned that the state had not properly monitored and reported on private prison operations since state law mandated it in 1987, AFSC undertook its own investigation into the private prison industry in Arizona. The Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) later announced that it would complete the statutorily-required biennial comparison review, which was released on December 21, 2011. The ADC study contains very little methodological information or supporting data, suffers from inconsistent data collection procedures, and overlooks important measures of prison safety. By contrast, AFSC’s report incorporates data that was omitted or deemed to be outside the scope of the ADC review, including security audits of private prisons before and after the Kingman escapes and data on six prisons operated by Corrections Corporation of America that are located in Arizona but do not contract with the state, putting them outside state oversight. In addition, AFSC’s analysis incorporates additional performance measures which have emerged as important aspects of the debate over prison privatization: recidivism, accountability, and transparency. The most common measurement of the effectiveness of a prison is its ability to reduce recidivism. Yet private prison corporations flatly refuse to measure their recidivism rates. The issues of accountability and transparency made headlines in 2010 when it was revealed that lobbyists for Corrections Corporation of America may have had a hand in drafting SB 1070, Arizona’s controversial anti-immigrant bill, which potentially represented millions of dollars in revenue for the corporation through lucrative immigrant detention contracts. Since then, more and more evidence has surfaced revealing the various prison corporations’ efforts to buy influence with state and federal governments, particularly through the involvement of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a group whose members consist of elected officials and corporate lobbyists. ALEC holds conferences at exclusive resorts where legislators and corporate representatives draft model legislation that members introduce in their various home states. Yet this activity is not considered lobbying under many states’ law, and the reimbursements ALEC provides to legislators (and their spouses) for travel and lodging at these conferences are not reported as political contributions. Most importantly, AFSC’s analysis found patterns of serious safety lapses in all the private prisons for which data was available. Together, this data demonstrates a set of problems endemic to the industry that could lead to future tragedies like the Kingman escapes. Malfunctioning security systems go unrepaired for months, leading staff to ignore safety protocols. Under-trained guards combined with poor state oversight leads to assaults, disturbances, and riots. For-profit prison staff members are too often unprepared, or unwilling, to intervene in these events, and risk losing control of the facilities. Insufficient rehabilitation programs, educational opportunities, or jobs for the prisoners provide idle time for conflicts to brew. The result is facilities that are unsafe for the people living and working inside them, as well as the surrounding community. Regardless of differing political views, most Arizonans want the same thing from their prisons: Increased public safety. Yet the state has deliberately obscured information that would cast private prisons in a negative light. It is critical that the people of Arizona and our elected representatives have solid, objective data on which to base important decisions about the future of our prisons. Billions of tax-payer dollars and the safety of our communities hang in the balance. ADC cancelled the Request for Proposals (RFP) for 5,000 private prison beds in December 2011, but issued a new RFP for 2,000 private prison beds in early February 2012. The taxpayers of Arizona deserve an honest accounting of what we stand to gain and lose if we continue to follow the “tough on crime” mantra. This report offers new insights and original data that reveals the truth about for-profit prisons in Arizona. Details: Tucson, AZ: American Friends Service Committee-Arizona, 2012. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2012 at http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSC_Arizona_Prison_Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSC_Arizona_Prison_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 124189 Keywords: Correctional Administration (Arizona)Evaluative StudiesPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Michigan Corrections Organization Title: Pitfalls and Promises The Real Risks to Residents and Taxpayers of Privatizing Prisons and Prison Services in Michigan Summary: Everyone is frustrated. Corrections spending just won’t come down. The prison population has been reduced, and corrections staff have been cut. Hard choices have been made. Risks have been taken, and sacrifices have been borne—but results remain elusive. Legislators are looking for new ideas. Private groups such as the Citizens Research Council of Michigan (CRC), the Center for Michigan and the Citizens Alliance on Prisons and Public Spending (CAPPS) have proposed ideas such as establishing a sentencing commission, expediting the parole process, and increased use of medical/geriatric parole—to name a few. Industry groups, meanwhile, are pushing to turn Michigan prisons over to for-profit companies. Privatization, however, is not a promising path. To understand why, this report examines the privatization of prisons and prison functions. The report begins with Michigan’s experience with private prisons then expands to other states’ experience. The focus is on costs and performance, paying special attention to the GEO Group, the private prison company most active in the state of Michigan. The report also reviews contracted correctional healthcare—again focusing on Michigan’s own experience, the experience in other states and Corizon, the company currently active in Michigan. Details: Lansing, MI: Michigan Corrections Organization - Local 562M, 2012. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2012 at: http://www.mco-seiu.org/files/2012/02/MCO-Private-Prison-Report-v8.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.mco-seiu.org/files/2012/02/MCO-Private-Prison-Report-v8.pdf Shelf Number: 124859 Keywords: Prisons (Michigan)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Helyar-Cardwell, Vicki, ed. Title: Delivering Justice The Role of the Public, Private and Voluntary Sectors in Prisons and Probation Summary: The number of people in the criminal justice system has increased extraordinarily over the last two decades. The focus is often on rocketing prison numbers – quite rightly lambasted as one of the worst features of this extraordinary growth. But, so too have the numbers on community sentences increased over the last two decades; the probation service now manages some 230,000 offenders in the community. This huge increase in scope of the justice system come at a significant financial cost. For example, investment in prisons has increased by nearly 40% in real terms between 2003-04 and 2008-09, from £2.52bn to £3.98bn a year. Despite this, capacity has not been able to meet demand, and as a result the prison system is severely overcrowded. So too in the community, the challenge of high probation caseloads is well known. As well as questions about whether the size and scope of our criminal justice system, in particular the custodial estate, is necessary and appropriate, to which the answer is surely no, there is also debate about how the government intends to financially sustain the functions of the justice system whilst maintaining historic low crime rates, and what the respective roles of the private, public and voluntary sectors should be in delivering these functions. Private prisons were first introduced to the UK in the 1990s and represent part of the move from the 1980s onwards towards greater competition across a range of public services. The catalyst for prison privatisation was to address overcrowding, reduce costs and to some degree improve standards. The involvement of private companies in building, financing and operating custodial facilities has been endorsed and expanded by the former Conservative administration, New Labour and now the Coalition government. Despite being strongly against private prisons in their time in opposition in the 1990s, once elected, the Labour government, faced by a spiralling prison population, quickly announced that they would be allowing private companies to bid for the running of new prisons, and that existing private prisons would not be taken back into the public sector. A consensus had now been reached amongst the major parties in support of privately-run prisons. Despite this political consensus, there has been a consistent critique, including from academics (Teague, 2010), the penal reform lobby (Neilson, 2009) and sections of the media (Monbiot, 2009). Following this initial foray in the 1990s, the next major step towards privatization was the establishment of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) in 2004, with the intention of introducing ‘contestability’ throughout the prison and probation services. The review by Patrick Carter (2003), on which the structure of NOMS was based, argued for ‘greater use of competition from private and voluntary providers’ (p.5), and called for this to be extended to existing prisons. It was clear that Carter, and subsequently the Government, envisaged a much greater role for the private and voluntary sector in the criminal justice system, and that the introduction of NOMS was seen as a way of facilitating this. The second important development was the announcement in 2008 that a number of charities were bidding in partnership with private sector companies for prison contracts. While the voluntary sector has long worked in both public sector and privately-run prisons, delivering services to prisoners, this was seen as a significant change in the landscape. There are now charities and private companies running prisons and delivering large-scale payment-by-results contracts within prisons. Perhaps the most significant ‘step change’ has occurred over the last year or so. Although the majority of the UK prison estate is managed by the public sector, there are now currently 14 private or ‘contracted out’ prisons. Last year Birmingham was the first public sector prison transferred to private sector management, and the government is currently tendering out a further nine prisons. At the same time probation services are being radically reshaped. The majority of probation functions are being competed out, with advice to courts and the management of high risk individuals retained in public sector. Probation Trusts will inevitably merge to form fewer, larger entities and become commissioners of services at local level, although it is questionable how ‘local’ this will be. Clearly, cuts in public spending are a significant cause of the current quickening in the pace of the privatisation of the prison estate, based on the (contested) belief that privately-run prisons are cheaper than their public sector equivalents. As NOMS Business Plan 2012-2013 makes clear, the stated aim of government is to drive down prison place costs (MoJ, 2012). The Probation Service has undergone a 19% real terms budget cut since 2008-09, and this pressure on cost is set to continue. While the ongoing debate about competition is sometimes presented as peripheral to the overall future of criminal justice policy, it is in fact highly significant. The issue of who delivers criminal justice services is important, and must be informed by full and accurate analysis of the benefits of different approaches. This collection of essays is intended to be a contribution to this debate. Details: London: Criminal Justice Alliance, 2012. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2012 at: http://www.criminaljusticealliance.org/delivering_justice.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.criminaljusticealliance.org/delivering_justice.pdf Shelf Number: 125314 Keywords: Criminal Justice Systems (U.K.)PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatizationProbationVolunteers in Criminal Justice |
Author: Shelden, Randall G. Title: Collateral Consequences of Interstate Transfer of Prisoners Summary: In 2011, the Supreme Court ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to immediately take actions to reduce its state prison overcrowding to 137% capacity. As a result California has embarked on sweeping criminal justice reforms which realign responsibility for low level offenders to the counties, through passage of Assembly Bill 109. Prior to the Supreme Court mandate, California had been addressing overcrowding concerns by utilizing out-of-state private prisons, the majority of which are operated by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). The temporary transfer of California inmates to other states began in late 2006, rose to a peak of 10,400 in early 2011, and declined to under 10,000 by mid-2011. Continued utilization of private out-of-state facilities is slated under the 2011-2012 budget to fall by nearly half by June 2012. In light of California’s extensive budget crisis, in early 2012, CCA offered to purchase California state prisons and operate them through a 20-year management contract. In exchange CCA requested an assurance that the prisons would remain at least 90% capacity (CCA, 2012). California not only declined the offer, but CDCR released plans in April 2012, to return out-of-state inmates to state facilities and terminate its contracts with private out-of-state facilities by FY 2015- 16. This proposal estimates savings of $318 million. In addition to cost savings, returning out-of-state inmates is a sound public policy decision. The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview of the effects of out-of-state transfers on inmates and families, to evaluate the potential public safety and policy merits of CDCR’s proposal. Details: San Francisco: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2012. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Brief: Accessed August 2, 2012 at: http://www.cjcj.org/files/Out_of_state_transfers.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.cjcj.org/files/Out_of_state_transfers.pdf Shelf Number: 125842 Keywords: Costs of Criminal JusticeCriminal Justice ReformPrison OvercrowdingPrisoners, Interstate Transfer (California)Private Prisons |
Author: Greene, Judith: Mazon, Alexis Title: Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive. Unsafe. Unnecessary Summary: Presented before a House of Representatives briefing sponsored by Rep. Jared Polis of Colorado on September 13, 2012, Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive, Unsafe, Unnecessary chronicles the May 2012 Adams County Correctional Center uprising in Natchez, Mississippi, a private for-profit facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America, under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The report details some of the tragic personal consequences for Juan Villanueva, his family, and others caught in the midst of the horrific conditions at the facility, leading to the insurrection. The report weaves into this narrative a look at the rise and fall of the private prison industry, and its resurrection through the benefit of federal contracts to detain and imprison undocumented immigrants, in an atmosphere of moral panic after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Details: Brooklyn, NY: Justice Strategies, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2012 at: http://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/privately-operated-federal-prisons-immigrants-expensive-unsafe-unnecessary Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/privately-operated-federal-prisons-immigrants-expensive-unsafe-unnecessary Shelf Number: 126464 Keywords: Federal PrisonsIllegal Aliens (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Robertson, Alistair Graham Title: Operation Streamline: Costs and Consequences Summary: In 2005, the Del Rio sector of the Border Patrol, an agency within the federal Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection, faced a peculiar issue. With civil detention facilities at capacity and voluntary return to Mexico available only to Mexican citizens, non-Mexican migrants were given a notice to appear in front of an immigration judge and released in the United States.” In 2004, Border Patrol apprehended approximately 10,000 non-Mexican migrants in the Del Rio sector; just one year later, the figure spiked to 15,000. The solution to this enforcement issue, Border Patrol decided, was to circumvent the civil immigration system by turning non-Mexican migrants over for criminal prosecution, a practice until then relegated almost exclusively to cases of violent criminal history or numerous reentries. Upon considering the proposition, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas responded with one caveat: in order to avoid an equal protection violation, the courts would have to criminally prosecute all migrants within a designated area, not just those from countries other than Mexico. With the signature of Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, it was decided to do just that. Starting in December of 2005, “Operation Streamline” required all undocumented border-crossers in the Eagle Pass area of the Del Rio Border Patrol sector to be funneled into the criminal justice system and charged with unlawful entry or re-entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325 or 1326). Those charged with improper entry usually face a sentence of up to 180 days, and a judge may impose a sentence of over ten years dependent upon criminal history. Re-entry offenders also face tough sentences, including a felony charge that places up to a ten-year bar on legal immigration. The Department of Homeland Security since has drastically expanded the criminal referral model through similar programs in the Yuma sector in 2006, the Laredo sector in 2007, and the Tucson sector in 2008. By 2010, every U.S.-Mexico border sector except California had implemented a “zero-tolerance” program of some sort, the whole of which are commonly referred to by the moniker of the original program— Operation Streamline. Depending upon the sector, the degree of implementation may vary significantly. For example, according to Federal Public Defenders in the Yuma and Del Rio sectors, Border Patrol refers nearly 100% of apprehended immigrants in those areas for criminal prosecution. In the Tucson sector, where greater migrant volume renders such high referral rates logistically unfeasible, the percentage on immigrants “Streamlined” may be closer to 10%, or about 70 of the 800 migrants apprehended each day. The resulting prisoner volume has led the Bureau of Prisons in the Department of Justice to depend upon private prison corporations like Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group. Through increased facility use and contracts for other services, CCA and GEO have enjoyed a combined $780 million increase in annual federal revenues since 2005. In FY2011, the federal government paid immense sums of taxpayer money to private prison companies, $744 million and $640 million to CCA and GEO Group, respectively. Much of this revenue derives from contracts for Criminal Alien Requirement (CAR) prisons, where federal immigrant prisoners are segregated in privately owned, privately operated prisons contracted by the Bureau of Prisons. The terms of CAR contracts include incentives (and sometimes guarantees) to fill facilities near capacity with immigrant prisoners. Each year, these companies dedicate millions of dollars to lobbying and campaign contributions. The federal dollars behind immigrant incarceration come at a significant cost to the taxpayer, climbing in 2011 to an estimated $1.02 billion annually. Before the announcement of Operation Streamline in 2005, the federal government annually committed about 58% of that total, or $591 million toward incarcerating immigrants. In 1994, the amount was about $72 million, 7% of its current level. Recent budget proposals indicate that federal spending on 2 Operation Streamline: Costs and Consquences prosecution and incarceration will likely increase, as Congress recently stated an ambition to “expand Operation Streamline to additional Border Patrol sectors” alongside a record-setting DHS budget request of $45.2 billion. The sheer volume of immigration cases has also severely burdened the courts in border districts, which have been forced to handle a near 350% increase of petty immigration cases from 12,411 in 2002 to 55,604 in 2010. In Tucson, courts may see as many as 200 immigrants lined up for prosecution in a single morning. To handle the expanded caseload, the Department of Justice has pursued a combination of resource-intensive options, including privately contracting with defense attorneys, deputizing Border Patrol agents as special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and bringing several magistrate judges out of retirement. Furthermore, Operation Streamline strips Assistant U.S. Attorneys of the power to prosecute the crimes they deem pressing. Immigration cases made up 36% of all criminal prosecutions nationwide in 2011, surpassing drug and fraud prosecutions combined. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2012. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed october 1, 2012 at: http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/files/GRL_Sept2012_Report%20final.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/files/GRL_Sept2012_Report%20final.pdf Shelf Number: 126537 Keywords: Border SecurityCosts of Criminal JusticeHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrationOperation Streamline (U.S.)Private Prisons |
Author: Heartland Alliance National Immigrant Justice Center Title: Not Too Late for Reform: A Call for President Obama to Close Failed Immigration Detention Facilities, Halt Costly Privatization & Restore Basic Human Rights Summary: The report details ongoing abuses at county jails holding immigrants in the Midwest and calls on the Obama administration to end the expansion and privatization of the abusive immigration detention system. The report focuses on three county jails — Jefferson County Jail and Tri-County Detention Center in Illinois and Boone County Jail in Kentucky — where the deplorable conditions of confinement are typical of immigration detention facilities across the United States. Details: Chicago: Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center and the Midwest Coalition for Human Rights, 2011. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 3, 2012 at: http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NIJC-MCHR%20Not%20Too%20Late%20for%20Reform%20Report%202011%20FINAL.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NIJC-MCHR%20Not%20Too%20Late%20for%20Reform%20Report%202011%20FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 126548 Keywords: Human RightsIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivate Prisons |
Author: Cole, Alexandra (Sachi) Title: Prisoners of Profit: Immigrants and Detention in Georgia Summary: As the number of immigrants detained annually approaches half a million, the prison-like conditions of immigration detention facilities and the substandard treatment afforded to the detainees are an area of increasing concern. Georgia is home to four immigration detention facilities: Stewart Detention Center (Stewart), North Georgia Detention Center (NGDC), Irwin County Detention Center (Irwin), and Atlanta City Detention Center (ACDC). Stewart is the largest detention facility in the U.S. It has become common practice for ICE to contract with private companies to operate detention facilities; indeed, private companies run three of the four detention facilities in Georgia documented in this report. Corrections Corporation of America, the largest private prison company in the U.S., whose annual revenue in 2010 was $1.7 billion, runs two of those facilities. Although it has been claimed that privatization of detention facilities is cost-effective, this proposition has been cast into serious doubt. What has been confirmed is the systemic violation of immigrant detainees’ civil and human rights while detained in substandard prison-like conditions ill suited for civil detainees. The ACLU of Georgia has documented the current landscape of immigration detention in Georgia. The following methods were used for documentation: · Interviews with 68 detainees from all four detention facilities · Interviews with detainees’ family members · Interviews with immigration attorneys · Detention center tours · Reviews of responses from officials · Review of grievances filed by detainees Findings from these diverse sources raise serious concerns about violations of detainees’ due process rights, inadequate living conditions, inadequate medical and mental health care, and abuse of power by those in charge. Details: Atlanta: ACLU of Georgia, 2012. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 26, 2012 at: http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/42/260/ Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/42/260/ Shelf Number: 127005 Keywords: Illegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrants (Georgia, U.S.)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: National People's Action Title: Jails Fargo: Banking on Immigrant Detention, Wells Fargo's Ties to the Private Prison Industry Summary: Private prison operators are profiting from the deepening immigration crisis in the United States. Companies like CCA and GEO Group have seen steady growth due to the countryʼs policy of locking up immigrants in privately-managed detention facilities. These companies have spent millions to shape this policy, win contracts, and ensure that the rules are fixed in their favor – all at the expense of some of the countryʼs most vulnerable people. These companies would not be positioned to profit from the countryʼs immigration crisis without the help of prominent Wall Street banks. The industry is capital-intensive and requires enormous amounts of financing from banks that sit at the countryʼs financial and economic crossroads. One bank, in particular, has distinguished itself from the competition as an investor in and lender to the industry: Wells Fargo. This report details the financial ties between Wells Fargo and the top private prison operators in the country: Corrections Corp of America (CCA), GEO Group, and Management and Training Corp (MTC). The information compiled in the report shows that as a lender and investor, Wells Fargo has provided critical support for the private prison industry. This report is the first in a series. A future report will detail other aspects and consequences of Wells Fargoʼs support for the private prison industry, and will raise further questions about the bankʼs role in the private prison industry and the vicious cycle of imprisonment and detention, profit, and political influence it facilitates. Details: Chicago, IL: National People's Action, 2012. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2012 at http://www.npa-us.org/files/wells_fargo_-_banking_on_immigrant_detention_0.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.npa-us.org/files/wells_fargo_-_banking_on_immigrant_detention_0.pdf Shelf Number: 127247 Keywords: Banking IndustryDetention FacilitiesImmigrant DetentionImmigrationPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Geisler, Gregory Title: Lake Erie Correctional Institution Summary: The Lake Erie Correctional Institution (LAECI) is a medium/minimum security prison, housing Level 1 and 2 inmates. It is located on 52 acres in Conneaut, Ohio, Ashtabula County. The rated capacity for Lake Erie Correctional Institution is 1,798. On the date of the inspection, the institution housed 1,794 inmates. The institution scored high on the most recent ACA audit. Demographically, 60.1 percent of the inmates are classified as black, and 36.5 percent as white. The average inmate age was 33 years. The institution employs 275 staff. Since the last CIIC inspection in September 2011, the state sold the institution to the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA assumed control of operations on December 31, 2011. In 2012, the institution increased its population by 300 inmates. Inspection Overview: The inspection of LAECI raised a number of significant concerns. At CCA staff’s invitation, CIIC will conduct a full re-inspection in six months’ time to reevaluate; this report is therefore to be considered a progress report. LAECI’s primary issue is safety and security. Staff interviews, inmate focus groups, the inmate survey, and institutional data all indicate that personal safety is at risk at LAECI. Assaults, fights, disturbances, and uses of force have all increased in comparison to prior years. There is a high presence of gang activity and illegal substance use. Inmates reported frequent extortion and theft. Incident reports indicate that staff hesitate to use force even when appropriate and at times fail to deploy chemical agents prior to physical force, risking greater injury to both inmates and staff. Staff also do not appropriately sanction inmates for serious misconduct. At the time of the inspection, the facility had no options for sanctions other than the segregation unit, which was full. The above issues are compounded by high staff turnover and low morale. New staff generally do not have the experience or training to be able to make quick judgments regarding the appropriate application of force or how to handle inmate confrontations. Staff also reported that they are often required to work an extra 12 hours per week, which may impact their response. Staff have relayed that they have already instituted additional security measures to control contraband and that they are in the process of implementing a stratification plan that will improve the overall facility environment and violence levels. Following the inspection, LAECI staff were very responsive to CIIC’s concerns. Staff promptly developed extensive action plans and engaged in several follow-up discussions with CIIC regarding the identified issues. LAECI staff also relayed that they are actively engaging local stakeholders to build positive relationships with the surrounding community. Details: Cleveland: ACLJ of Ohio, 2013. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2013 at: http://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2013_0123LakeErieCorrectionalInstitutionFullReport.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.acluohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2013_0123LakeErieCorrectionalInstitutionFullReport.pdf Shelf Number: 128397 Keywords: Prison AdministrationPrisons (Ohio, U.S.)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Markham, Timothy R. Title: Imprisoned by Profit: Breaking Colorado’s Dependence on For-Profit Prisons Summary: As Colorado tackles the issues around a declining prison population, Colorado WINS is releasing a new report that outlines how Colorado relies on the for-profit prisons and highlights the importance of prioritizing a transition away from them. “Imprisoned by Profit: Breaking Colorado’s Dependence on For-Profit Prisons” examines the costs and benefits and concludes that since the incarceration crisis of 20 years ago has receded and the state has a surplus of bed space, we need to put public facilities first. Details: Denver, CO: Colorado WINS, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2013 at: http://issuu.com/coloradowins/docs/imprisoned-by-profit Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://issuu.com/coloradowins/docs/imprisoned-by-profit Shelf Number: 129475 Keywords: Prisons (Colorado, U.S.)Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Mason, Cody Title: International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization Summary: For-profit prison privatization, which dates back to 16th Century England, began to enjoy a modern reincarnation in the United States in the 1980s. Privatization advocates promised low-cost, quality, detention services at a time when government resources were being strained under the weight of exploding prison populations. It was on the back of these promises that lawmakers and officials would hand over eight percent of America’s prisoners, as well as larger amounts of its federal pre-trial and immigrant detainees, to privately owned or operated facilities by 2011. However, although privatization has enjoyed a steady reemergence in the United States, the companies managing these facilities have faced persistent criticism for providing low-quality services, failing to save taxpayer money, and negatively affecting criminal justice policy. Despite these failures, several countries have followed the United States in utilizing private prisons and detention centers with the intent of decreasing correctional expenditures and reducing prison overcrowding. These developments have helped private U.S. prison companies diversify their investments at a time when America’s prison population growth has stalled. For example, 14 percent of the revenue for America’s second largest private prison company, The GEO Group, came from international services in fiscal year 2012. Similarly, the spread of prison privatization has also benefited for-profit companies from other countries, including UK-based G4S, which claims to be the largest security service provider in the world. Together, these companies have thrived off of the expanded privatization of prisons, immigration detention systems, and other governmental services, while often failing to deliver on the services that were promised. This report investigates the trends identified above and explores the growth of for-profit prison privatizations across the globe. Noteworthy findings discussed in this report include: • At least 11 countries, spread across North America, South America, Europe, Africa, and Oceania, are engaged in some level of prison privatization. • While the United States maintains the highest total number of privately held prisoners, Australia, Scotland, England and Wales, and New Zealand hold a larger proportion of prisoners in private facilities, with a high of 19 percent in Australia. • As in the United States, immigrant detention has been a particular target of privatization in the United Kingdom, which has 73 percent of its immigrant detainees held privately, and Australia, which has a wholly private immigrant detention system. • The prison privatization market outside of the United States is dominated by The GEO Group and two British companies, G4S and Serco. • Media reports from countries including the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada have reflected research conducted in the United States showing that private prison companies’ profit motives often lead to inadequate services and unsafe conditions. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2013. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 22, 2013 at: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_International%20Growth%20Trends%20in%20Prison%20Privatization.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_International%20Growth%20Trends%20in%20Prison%20Privatization.pdf Shelf Number: 129671 Keywords: Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Kirby, Holly Title: Locked Up & Shipped Away: Interstate Prisoner Transfers and the Private Prison Industry Summary: As part of the ongoing efforts to create truly just public safety policy, this report examines state governments' practice of transferring incarcerated people out of their home states to for-profit private prisons across the United States. Section I of this report provides a brief history of the private prison industry, including how private prison corporations have raked in enormous profits from mass incarceration in the United States. In Section II we discuss the lack of uniform laws regulating the leasing of prison beds from private prison corporations, both in and out-of-state. The paucity of laws, coupled with the latitude granted to the private prison industry, enables the mass interstate transfer of incarcerated people. Section III provides an overview of today's interstate prisoner transfer landscape, including details on which states currently have prisoners in out-of-state private prisons. We provide information on state spending and Corrections Corporation of America revenues for out-of-state private prison contracts. In Section IV we describe how the transfer of prisoners out of their home states undermines family connections and prisoner rehabilitation. In Section V we discuss oversight and liability issues for state agencies and private prison companies related to the interstate transfer of prisoners. Finally, Section VI provides our recommendations. We urge states to prioritize the return of incarcerated people currently housed out-of-state by taking steps to reduce their prison populations and passing legislation that bans the exportation of incarcerated people from their home states, particularly to for-profit private prisons. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2013. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/locked_up_shipped_away.pdf Shelf Number: 131762 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationPrisoners, Interstate TransferPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Warehoused and Forgotten: Immigrants Trapped in Our Shadow Private Prison System Summary: In rural Texas, 3,000 men are locked inside a "tent city," sleeping in bunk beds spaced only a few feet apart. The tents are crawling with insects and the smell of broken, overflowing toilets. This is Willacy County Correctional Center: a physical symbol of everything that is wrong with enriching the private prison industry and criminalizing immigration. More than 25,000 low-security non-U.S. citizens languish at thirteen private prisons like Willacy under Criminal Alien Requirement (CAR) contracts. For years, these for-profit prisons have been able to operate in the shadows, effectively free from public scrutiny. That ends now. Our report documents the ACLU's multi-year investigation into the five CAR facilities in Texas. We uncovered evidence of shocking abuse and mistreatment, families torn apart, and the excessive use of solitary confinement. The second-class prisoners in CAR facilities are trapped at the intersection of three disturbing trends: the national mass incarceration crisis, prison privatization, and the criminalization of immigration. This is the story of how and why things have gotten so bad. Details: New York: ACLU, 2014. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2014 at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf Shelf Number: 132496 Keywords: Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrison ConditionsPrivate PrisonsPrivatizationSolitary ConfinementUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Parker, Christina Title: For-Profit Family Detention: Meet the Private Prison Corporations Making Millions by Locking Up Refugee Families Summary: In this joint report by Grassroots Leadership and Justice Strategies, we review the history of charges of sexual abuse and neglect of children, indifference to medical needs, inadequate and unsanitary food, and brutal treatment by staff, levied in lawsuits, government investigations, and allegations by those held in family detention facilities operated by private, for-profit, prison corporations. These same corporations are now being contracted by the federal government to detain refugee families arriving at our southern border after fleeing the violence in Central America. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership; Brooklyn, NY: Justice Strategies, 2014. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/publications/For%20Profit%20Family%20Detention%20Oct%202014_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/publications/For%20Profit%20Family%20Detention%20Oct%202014_0.pdf Shelf Number: 133907 Keywords: Child Abuse and NeglectIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant ChildrenImmigrant DetentionPrison Privatization (U.S.)Private PrisonsRefugees |
Author: Kirby, Holly Title: Locked Up & Shipped Away: Paying the Price for Vermont's Response to Prison Overcrowding Summary: This report is a Vermont-focused, supplemental brief to the November 2013 report, Locked Up and Shipped Away: Interstate Prisoner Transfers and the Private Prison Industry, states - Vermont, Idaho, Hawaii, and California - collectively send more than 10,000 prisoners to out-of-state private prisons. Grassroots Leadership now coordinates the national Locked Up and Shipped Away Campaign to shed light on the experiences of those directly affected and demand that state leaders put an end to this inhumane practice, reduce the number of people behind bars, and cut ties with the private, for-profit prison industry. Grassroots Leadership has partnered with Vermonters for Criminal Justice Reform - whose mission is to work for a more restorative and effective criminal justice response - to fight for the return of nearly 500 Vermonters currently housed in out-of-state private prisons. This report presents the facts about Vermont's practice of shipping prisoners far from home, and most importantly, gives voice to the Vermont prisoners and their families and loved ones enduring the consequences Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/locked_up_shipped_away_vt_web.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/locked_up_shipped_away_vt_web.pdf Shelf Number: 135437 Keywords: Correctional Administration Prison Overcrowding (Vermont)Prisoners, Interstate TransferPrivate Prisons Privatization |
Author: Global Detention Project Title: A Survey of Private Contractor Involvement in U.S. Facilities Used to Confine People for Immigration-related Reasons Summary: The private prison industry in the United States has grown significantly during the last several decades and along with it there has been an apparent increase in the outsourcing of services at facilities used for immigration detention purposes. However, while much has been written about private ownership and management of detention facilities, the phenomenon of non-state-actor involvement in immigration detention extends beyond these activities. For instance, while private contractors are responsible for overall management of some two dozen immigration-related detention facilities in the United States, this report demonstrates that private contractors provide a range additional services at nearly 100 prisons, shelters, and detention centers across the United States that have been used to hold migrants and asylum seekers. Part of the difficulty in investigating this phenomenon is that the U.S. immigration detention estate is massive (involving several hundred facilities) and employs numerous types of institutions, from local jails and federal prisons to juvenile detention centers and dedicated immigration detention centers. Thus, to accurately document the extent of non-state-actor involvement in the U.S. immigration detention regime it is necessary to look at all these different types of facilities and assess the role played by different actors in them. This survey represents an initial, modest attempt to begin to fill some of the gaps in our understanding of this phenomenon. The information included in the following charts has been compiled based on an extensive search of available websites provided by facilities in the United States that have been used for the purpose of migration detention or by service providers active in those facilities. Based solely on this review of online information, the Global Detention Project was able to determine that of the hundreds of facilities that have been used in recent years to hold immigration detainees, no less than 83 explicitly mention on their websites some form of privatization. In addition, of the two dozen dedicated immigration facilities, all but one report outsourcing services to private contractors. The most common form of private involvement in these facilities is management. Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), one of the largest private prison companies, manages seven of the 24 dedicated facilities. However, private companies offer a range of other services at detention sites and a narrow focus on specialized immigration facilities fails to capture the full range of involvement of non-state entities in migration-related detention. In fact, one of the more notable outcomes of this limited research project has been to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the outsourcing of responsibilities at U.S. detention centers. Private actors provide food services, security, healthcare, among a host of other services. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Global Detention Project, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/docs/Survey_of_US_contractors_2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/docs/Survey_of_US_contractors_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 136511 Keywords: Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Isaacs, Caroline Title: Assessment of Riots in Management & Training Corp Kingman Prison 2015 Summary: On July 1st, 2015, a riot erupted in a prison in Kingman, Arizona operated by the for-profit prison company, Management and Training Corporation (MTC). The next day, a second reportedly occurred. Six prison guards were injured and the facilities were so badly damaged that over 1,000 prisoners had to be transferred elsewhere. Governor Doug Ducey ordered the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) to investigate the cause of the riots. While we welcome any and all information coming from the Department in regards to these incidents, the American Friends Service Committee has serious concerns about the ADC's ability to impartially assess all the factors that contributed to the riots-most significantly its own failure to properly monitor its contractors. This report represents an effort to provide first-hand documentation from prisoners and staff, as well as a larger analysis informed by over 15 years of monitoring the for-profit prison industry and the Arizona Department of Corrections. Details: Tucson, AZ: American Friends Service Committee, Arizona,2015. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2015 at: https://afscarizona.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/afsckingmanassessment2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://afscarizona.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/afsckingmanassessment2015.pdf Shelf Number: 136963 Keywords: Prison ConditionsPrison RiotsPrivate Prisons |
Author: Graziani, Cate Title: Incorrect Care: A Prison Profiteer Turns Care into Confinement Summary: This report details the strategic expansion by private prison corporations to fill profit gaps from efforts to reduce mass incarceration through an emerging Treatment Industrial Complex. As criminal justice reform sweeps the nation, an alarming trend has emerged that could mean private prison profiteers control a person's fate for life, not just the term of a prison sentence. The same private prison profiteers who built billion dollar empires as partners in tough on crime policies are adapting to reforms by rebranding themselves - as humane treatment providers. The criminal justice system has created ample opportunities for their expansion, including mental health hospitals and civil commitment centers, correctional healthcare, and community corrections. This report will look specifically at one segment of their expansion: mental health hospitals and civil commitment centers, facilities that represent the potential for lifetime confinement and long-term guaranteed profit. In fact, the same for-profit company is making aggressive moves to take over both types of facilities. Correct Care Solutions, formerly known as GEO Care, a spin-off of GEO Group, has deep roots in the private prison industry. Although the company has shifted and changed numerous times over the last few years, CCS currently runs seven 'treatment' facilities in Florida, Texas and South Carolina, including five mental health facilities and two civil commitment centers. This report's in-depth analysis of GEO Group, GEO Care and now Correct Care Solutions' involvement in operating mental health hospitals and civil commitment centers exposes serious concerns. Details: Austin, TX: Grassroots Leadership, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 16, 2016 at: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/incorrect_care_grassrootsleadership_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/incorrect_care_grassrootsleadership_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138252 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Mercadal, Gertrudis Title: Prison Privatization in the United States: A New Strategy for Racial Control Summary: There has been a stunning build-up of prisons and a growing trend in prison privatization in the last 30 years, including the rise of maximum security units. The goal of my dissertation is to understand the ideological, historic, political, and economic processes behind the changes in the criminal justice system of the United States. I analyze this problem from multiple angles - labor and policy history, discourse and public opinion, and race in America. The aim of this analysis is to uncover the reasons why crime legislation became progressively more punitive, reaction to African Americans gains in post-Civil Rights more hostile, and the manifold ways in which these phenomena drive the expansion of the prison system and its increasing privatization. In the process of this expansion, a racial caste system which oppresses young African Americans and people of color has become recast and entrenched. Specifically, I offer the notion that in the last three decades, punitive crime legislation focused on African Americans and served to deal with labor needs and racial conflict with harsher penal legislation; in doing so, it depoliticized race, institutionalized racial practices, and served the interests of private prison businesses in new ways oppressive ways. Using interdisciplinary methods which weave together qualitative and quantitative analysis, I find that punitive crime policies in the last thirty years used the concept of crime as political currency by government officials in order to appear tough on crime, and by business representatives interested in exploiting the prison industry. The conflation of business and political interests, and the recasting of crime as a race problem, served to taint public institutions and media dissemination with racist imperatives which stereotyped poor African Americans. The end result is a constant re-positioning of young black males as fodder for economic exploitation. The dissertation also addresses the high cost of imprisonment and the multiple social problems brought from shifting inmates from wards of the State to profit-making opportunities in the hands of private entrepreneurs. The result is high numbers of recidivism, and a growing underclass of people who will always be unemployed or underemployed and return to low income communities that suffer from the endless cycle of poverty and imprisonment. Details: Boca Raton, FL: Florida Atlantic University, 2014. 245p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 28, 2016 at: https://fau.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fau%3A13688/datastream/OBJ/view/Prison_privatization_in_the_United_States__a_new_strategy_for_racial_control.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://fau.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fau%3A13688/datastream/OBJ/view/Prison_privatization_in_the_United_States__a_new_strategy_for_racial_control.pdf Shelf Number: 138447 Keywords: African AmericansPrisonersPrivate PrisonsPrivatizationRacial BiasRacial Disparities |
Author: New South Wales. Audit Office Title: Performance frameworks in custodial centre operations Summary: The effectiveness of Corrective Services NSW's performance framework is limited because organisational key performance indicators (KPIs) do not cascade to public correctional centres, according to a report released today by the Acting New South Wales Auditor-General, Tony Whitfield. "As a result, individual public correctional centres could not be assessed on how well they are contributing to overall Corrective Service objectives, and it is difficult to vary performance expectations in response to changing operating environments," said Mr Whitfield. "Its commissioning and contestability project is designed to address these issues," he added. Some key organisational targets were met and publicly reported In 2014-15, Corrective Services met five of 12 organisational targets. Targets that were not met include nil prisoner-on-prisoner assaults and eight hours' time out of cells for inmates in secure facilities. It advised that these targets reflect government policy and can be difficult to consistently achieve in a high risk corrective services environment. "Corrective Services does not publicly report on public correctional centre performance and provides only limited information for private centres, which limits transparency and accountability," said Mr Whitfield. Corrective Services' low time out of cells low cost system increases risk More inmates are being housed in existing facilities, reducing the time out of cells for inmates and the cost per inmate. "While the increasing number of inmates is reducing the inmate per day cost, it also is adversely affecting inmate welfare and increasing the risk of inmate self-harm," said Mr Whitfield. "In 2014-15 the inmate cost per day was $190.29," he added. The effectiveness of remedial action in response to poor KPI performance was limited Corrective Services set remedial actions in response to poor performance against KPIs, but correctional centre general managers found it difficult to deal with underperformance as not all employees have performance agreements. Correctional centres met most operating standards Corrective Services has developed a comprehensive suite of operating standards and specifications to assess correctional centres against international best practice. High security public centres met most operating standards while private centres met all but one operating specification for the 2014-15 contract year. Lower security public correctional centres have not been assessed against these standards. Private correctional centres met all but one performance linked fee Junee Correctional Centre met all of its performance linked fees and Parklea Correctional Centre met all but one for the 2014-15 contract year. The link between performance linked fees and outcomes could be strengthened by applying greater weight to outcomes-focused performance measures, such as prisoner-on-staff assaults. Details: Sydney: Audit Office, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2016 at: http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/publications/latest-reports/performance-frameworks-custodial-centre-ops Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/publications/latest-reports/performance-frameworks-custodial-centre-ops Shelf Number: 138520 Keywords: Correctional InstitutionsCorrrections ManagementPrison AdministrationPrisonsPrivate Prisons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring of Contract Prisons Summary: The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which is the component of the Department of Justice (Department) responsible for incarcerating all federal defendants sentenced to prison, was operating at 20 percent over its rated capacity as of December 2015. To help alleviate overcrowding and respond to congressional mandates, in 1997 the BOP had begun contracting with privately operated institutions (often referred to as "contract prisons"), at first on a smaller scale and later more extensively, to confine federal inmates who are primarily low security, criminal alien adult males with 90 months or less remaining to serve on their sentences. As of December 2015, contract prisons housed roughly 22,660 of these federal inmates, or about 12 percent of the BOP's total inmate population. These contract prisons were operated by three private corporations: Corrections Corporation of America; GEO Group, Inc.; and Management and Training Corporation. The BOP's annual expenditures on contract prisons increased from approximately $562 million in fiscal year (FY) 2011 to $639 million in FY 2014. In recent years, disturbances in several federal contract prisons resulted in extensive property damage, bodily injury, and the death of a Correctional Officer. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review to examine how the BOP monitors these facilities. We also assessed whether contractor performance meets certain inmate safety and security requirements and analyzed how contract prisons and similar BOP institutions compare with regard to inmate safety and security data. We found that, in most key areas, contract prisons incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP institutions and that the BOP needs to improve how it monitors contract prisons in several areas. Throughout this report, we note several important corrective actions the BOP has taken, in response to findings and recommendations in our April 2015 audit of the Reeves County contract prison, to improve its monitoring of contract prisons, including in the areas of health and correctional services. The BOP's administration, monitoring, and oversight of contract prisons is conducted through three branches at BOP headquarters and on site. According to the BOP, at each contract prison, two BOP onsite monitors and a BOP Contracting Officer, in cooperation with other BOP subject matter experts, oversee each contractor's compliance with 29 vital functions within 8 operational areas, including correctional programs, correctional services, and health services. The BOP monitors contractor performance through various methods and tools that include monitoring checklists, monitoring logs, written evaluations, performance meetings, and regular audits. Results in Brief We found that in a majority of the categories we examined, contract prisons incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP institutions. We analyzed data from the 14 contract prisons that were operational during the period of our review and from a select group of 14 BOP institutions with comparable inmate populations to evaluate how the contract prisons performed relative to the selected BOP institutions. Our analysis included data from FYs 2011 through 2014 in eight key categories: (1) contraband, (2) reports of incidents, (3) lockdowns, (4) inmate discipline, (5) telephone monitoring, (6) selected grievances, (7) urinalysis drug testing, and (8) sexual misconduct.3 With the exception of fewer incidents of positive drug tests and sexual misconduct, the contract prisons had more incidents per capita than the BOP institutions in all of the other categories of data we examined. For example, the contract prisons confiscated eight times as many contraband cell phones annually on average as the BOP institutions. Contract prisons also had higher rates of assaults, both by inmates on other inmates and by inmates on staff. We note that we were unable to evaluate all of the factors that contributed to the underlying data, including the effect of inmate demographics and facility locations, as the BOP noted in response to a working draft of this report. However, consistent with our recommendation, we believe that the BOP needs to examine the reasons behind our findings more thoroughly and identify corrective actions, if necessary. The three contract prisons we visited were all cited by the BOP for one or more safety and security deficiencies, including administrative infractions such as improper storage of use-of-force video footage, as well as more serious or systemic deficiencies such as failure to initiate discipline in over 50 percent of incidents reviewed by onsite monitors over a 6-month period. The contractors corrected the safety and security deficiencies that the BOP had identified. As a result, the BOP determined that each prison was sufficiently compliant with the safety and security aspects of its contract to continue with the contract during the period covered by our review. However, we concluded that the BOP still must improve its oversight of contract prisons to ensure that federal inmates' rights and needs are not placed at risk when they are housed in contract prisons. Our site visits also revealed that two of the three contract prisons we visited were improperly housing new inmates in Special Housing Units (SHU), which are normally used for disciplinary or administrative segregation, until beds became available in general population housing. These new inmates had not engaged in any of the behaviors cited in American Correctional Association standards and BOP policies that would justify being placed in such administrative or disciplinary segregation. When the OIG discovered this practice during the course of our fieldwork, we brought it to the attention of the BOP Director, who immediately directed that these inmates be removed from the SHUs and returned to the general population. The BOP Director also mandated that the contracts for all contract prisons be modified to prohibit SHU placement for inmates unless there is a policy-based reason to house them there. Since that time, the BOP informed us that the practice of housing new inmates in the SHU is no longer occurring in the contract prisons and that the BOP has not identified any further non-compliance to date regarding this issue. Finally, we found that the BOP needs to improve the way it monitors contract prisons. We focused our analysis on the BOP's Large Secure Adult Contract Oversight Checklist (checklist) because, as described by BOP operating procedures, it is an important element of the BOP's Quality Assurance Plan, as well as a mechanism BOP onsite monitors use to document contract compliance on a daily basis. We believe onsite monitors are best positioned to provide the BOP's quickest and most direct responses to contract compliance issues as they arise. We found that the checklist does not address certain important BOP policy and contract requirements in the areas of health and correctional services. As a result, the BOP cannot as effectively ensure that contract prisons comply with contract requirements and BOP policies in these areas and that inmates in contract prisons receive appropriate health and correctional services. For health services, the checklist does not include observation steps to verify that inmates receive certain basic medical services. For example, the observation steps do not include checks on whether inmates received initial examinations, immunizations, and tuberculosis tests, as BOP policy requires. We also found that monitoring of healthcare for contract compliance lacks coordination from BOP staff responsible for health services oversight. For correctional services, the checklist does not include observation steps to ensure searches of certain areas of the prison, such as inmate housing units or recreation, work, and medical areas, or for validating actual Correctional Officer staffing levels and the daily Correctional Officer duty rosters. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 1 6-06: Accessed August 29, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf Shelf Number: 140070 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal Bureau of PrisonsPrison ConditionsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Howard League for Penal Reform Title: Corporate crime? A dossier on the failure of privatisation in the criminal justice system Summary: 'The children and young people who were sent to secure training centres were sent there because they had acted unlawfully and to learn to obey the law, yet more of them were subject to unlawful actions during their detention. I need, I think, to say no more.' Mr Justice Foskett in a High Court ruling that children in the four privately run secure training centres were unlawfully restrained over the course of 10 years. (The Children's Rights Alliance for England v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 8 (Admin)) G4S and Serco have been the focus of public attention as the tagging scandal and alleged multi-million pound fraud of the taxpayer has unfolded in recent months. These are companies who have track records of failure in delivering public services: the infamous fiasco of G4S not providing sufficient security for the Olympics led to 3,500 army personnel being drafted in (Telegraph, 2013); the inquest into the death of Jimmy Mubenga, who was restrained to death by three G4S guards on a deportation fight, ruled that he had been unlawfully killed (Monaghan, 2013); and Serco has been heavily criticised and had its contract curtailed for failing to meet national standards, falsifying data and a 'bullying culture' in its operation of out-of-hours GP contract in Cornwall (BBC, 2013a). Questions remain regarding how much blame can be laid at these specific companies or whether this is a systemic issue raising wider questions about the role of the private sector in delivering public services. The privatisation of justice in England and Wales began 22 years ago. Wolds prison, run by G4S, was the first private prison, opening in 1992. Altcourse, run by G4S, was the first designed, constructed, managed and financed private prison in the UK, opening in 1997. Since then, the role of the private sector in the criminal justice system has steadily increased: there are now 18 privately run prisons and private companies hold a plethora of other contracts, including prison vans, courts and electronic tagging. Privatisation of the criminal justice system shows no signs of abating. The current Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Grayling, is pushing through reforms to privatise 70 per cent of the probation service (Ministry of Justice, 2013). This is despite evidence that the probation service is one of the highest performing public sector services in the country: every probation trust was rated 'good' or 'exceptional' by the government's own performance ratings (National Offender Management Service, 2013a) and the probation service was recently awarded the British Quality Foundation's 'Gold Medal for Excellence'. It was the first time a public sector organisation has won the award (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Concerns and controversy have dogged the private sector since its role in the criminal justice system began. Most recently, G4S and Serco were found to have overcharged on its contracts for tagging, including claims for people who were dead or in prison (Hansard, 2013). They have been forced to pay back nearly L200 million, and have come under investigation from the Serious Fraud Office. Neither company is currently under investigation by the police for its role in the tagging scandal, despite it being behaviour which the chairman of G4S has acknowledged was "ethically wrong" (BBC, 2013b). Since opening in April 2012, G4S-run Oakwood prison has been bombarded with reports that it is unsafe, nothing works and prison inspectors found that 'it's easier to get drugs than soap' (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2013). It, alongside with Serco-run Thameside, were recently named among the country's three worst prisons, receiving the lowest performance rating possible, with the National Offender Management Service expressing 'serious concern' (National Offender Management Service, 2013b). The Prison and Probation Ombudsman identified 'serious failings' after a man was found collapsed and not breathing in his cell but staff were unable to access a defibrillator because it was locked away in a cupboard and there was no doctor on site (BBC, 2013c). In recent months there have been four rooftop protests and a riot. These were referred to by G4S and the government as not a riot, but 'concerted indiscipline' and not rooftop protests but 'working at height' (Hansard, 2014). It is a sign of the scale of the problems faced by Oakwood that both commissioner and commissioned now resort to semantics in order to defend the latest failure of outsourcing. These companies are well-resourced at the procurement stage, preparing competitive bids which put low costs before quality of service. There is, however, no evidence that they are any better at running prisons than the state (National Audit Office, 2013). Questions remain about the real cost of delivering services effectively; whether it presents value for money for the tax payer; and the effects of privatisation on the expansion of the prison system for the primary benefit of lining shareholders pockets. To make profit, the private sector needs business - there are questions to be asked about whether the aims of such companies are fundamentally at odds with the aims of reducing the prison population and reoffending. Details: London: The Howard League, 2014. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 8, 2016 at: http://howardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Privatisation-audit-full-version.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://howardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Privatisation-audit-full-version.pdf Shelf Number: 145131 Keywords: Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Shadow Prisons: Immigrant Detention in the South Summary: Just days after winning election, President-elect Donald Trump announced that he intends to round up and deport up to 3 million immigrants. Such a plan, if carried out immediately, would require a massive – and costly – expansion of America's prison and detention infrastructure at a time when politicians and policymakers across the ideological spectrum are working to reduce the nation’s prison population, the world's largest. And it would likely be a major boost to the fortunes of private prison companies that profit from incarceration – even though most studies show that privately operated prisons are generally more dangerous, less effective and no less expensive than government-run facilities. Recently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) decided to add 10,000 beds to its immigrant detention system, increasing the capacity to 45,000 immigrants per day. But, as a result of Trump's proposed deportation plan, the DHS could need many thousands more. Unsurprisingly, private prison stocks have soared since Trump's election. An expansion of the immigrant detention system threatens to greatly exacerbate the mass incarceration crisis in America. And it would violate our nation's basic values and cement our reputation as a country intolerant of immigrants. The findings of this study demonstrate that the immigrant detention system is already rife with civil rights violations and poor conditions that call into question the DHS’s commitment to the due process rights and safety of detainees. Many of these detainees have lived here for years; others recently fled violence in their home countries to seek refuge in the United States. This report is the result of a seven-month investigation of six detention centers in the South, a region where tens of thousands of people are locked up for months, sometimes even years, as they await hearings or deportation. The South is a leader in immigration detention, holding one out of every six detainees in the United States. A closer look makes it clear why it holds this distinction. Detained immigrants in the South are frequently denied the opportunity of a bond hearing that would free them until their cases are adjudicated. The region's immigration courts, which are often inaccessible to the public, are hostile to immigrants not fortunate enough to have an attorney. And so they wait behind bars in remote Southern facilities virtually indistinguishable from prisons. Many of the facilities are former jails or prisons that were shut down after civil rights investigations and lawsuits revealed poor conditions and abuse. Now, it’s the detainees who face abusive and dangerous conditions at these facilities, which fail to meet basic legal and regulatory standards. And it's the detainees who often find there is little hope for release as their due process rights are denied. The investigation by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and the Adelante Alabama Worker Center focuses on detention centers in Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Louisiana. Three are operated by private companies and three by county sheriffs. All are paid by the DHS on a per diem basis. The report is based on tours of each facility and more than 300 in-person interviews with detainees. They represent more than 5 percent of the average daily population of the detention centers studied. From facility to facility, their stories are remarkably similar accounts of abuse, neglect and rights denied – symptoms of an immigrant detention system where the failures of the nation's immigration system intersect with the failures of its prison system. Details: Atlanta, GA: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/leg_ijp_shadow_prisons_immigrant_detention_report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/leg_ijp_shadow_prisons_immigrant_detention_report.pdf Shelf Number: 147908 Keywords: Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DeportationImmigrant DetentionImmigrationPrivate Prisons |
Author: In the Public Interest Title: The Banks That Finance Private Prison Companies Summary: As America's incarcerated and detained populations have boomed in recent years, the business of owning and operating prisons and jails has grown into a multi-billion-dollar industry. A new report uncovers which Wall Street banks finance the industry’s two leaders, CoreCivic (formerly "Corrections Corporation of America [CCA]") and GEO Group. The Banks That Finance Private Prison Companies shows that six banks have played large roles in bankrolling CoreCivic and GEO Group: Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, BNP Paribas, SunTrust, and U.S. Bancorp. The report also reveals how these banks profit from providing credit, bonds, and loans to private prison companies. Details: Washington, DC: In the Public Interest, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2016 at: https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_BanksPrivatePrisonCompanies_Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_BanksPrivatePrisonCompanies_Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147942 Keywords: Banking IndustryPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contract with CoreCivic, Inc. to Operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez, Mississippi Summary: In April 2009, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded a contract to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which is now known as CoreCivic, Inc., to house up to 2,567 low-security, non-U.S. citizen adult male inmates in the Adams County Correctional Center (Adams County). The BOP exercised the contract's second of three 2-year option periods in 2015, extending it through July 2017 and increasing its value to about $468 million. As of June 2016, it was the third largest Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) contract in terms of dollars obligated since fiscal year (FY) 2009. The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit, covering the period April 1, 2012, through March 31, 2015, to: (1) assess CoreCivic's contract performance; (2) determine whether CoreCivic complied with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to the contract; and (3) assess the BOP's formation and administration of the contract. We found that CoreCivic's execution of the contract's requirements did not fully accomplish the BOP's program. goals in several respects. In May 2012, an inmate riot at the facility resulted in a correctional officer's death and injuries to approximately 20 staff and inmates. The riot, according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affidavit, was a consequence of what inmates perceived to be inadequate medical care, substandard food, and disrespectful staff members. A BOP after-action report found deficiencies in staffing levels, staff experience, communication between staff and inmates, and CoreCivic's intelligence systems. The report specifically cited the lack of Spanish-speaking staff and staff inexperience. Four years after the riot, we were deeply concerned to find that the facility was plagued by the same significant deficiencies in correctional and health services and Spanish-speaking staffing. In 19 of the 38 months following the riot, we found CoreCivic staffed correctional services at an even lower level than at the time of the riot in terms of actual post coverage. Yet CoreCivic's monthly reports to the BOP, which were based on simple headcounts, showed that correctional staffing levels had improved in 36 of those 38 months. With regard to Spanish-speaking staff, while the BOP's post-riot after-action plan recommended adding to the contract minimum requirements for bilingual staff, we found that the BOP did not modify the contract to include this requirement until June 2015, subsequent to the start of our audit. Moreover, the contract modification does not define the level of speaking proficiency required and has no deadline or target date for compliance. As of July 2015, the facility's inmate population consisted of approximately 2,300 aliens, predominately Mexican-nationals, yet only 4 of 367 staff spoke fluent Spanish. By February 2016, CoreCivic officials told us the number of fluent Spanish-speaking staff actually dropped to three people, and CoreCivic's January 2016 job announcements for correctional officers stated no preference for bilingual applicants. In addition, the BOP told us that it does not validate the contractor's staff for Spanish-speaking skills, and has not established any validation criteria for doing so. We also found lower qualification levels and significantly higher staffing turnover rates for Adams County correctional officers and believe these factors contributed to the facility's lack of experienced staff, which the BOP identified in its after-action report as a systemic problem in the area of safety and security at the facility. We reviewed CoreCivic's hiring practices and determined the facility employs correctional officers with qualifications that would have been insufficient for employment at BOP-managed institutions. For example, the BOP requires entry-level correctional officers to have either a 4-year college degree or equivalent work experience, while CoreCivic does not require education beyond high school. Additionally, we found significantly higher turnover rates at the facility than those at comparable BOP institutions and believe it likely results from the substantially lower pay and benefits provided by CoreCivic. We found CoreCivic pays significantly lower wages and offers less time off than the BOP, and provides fewer career advancement opportunities. For example, the BOP pays entry-level correctional officers $18.69 per hour, 48 percent higher than the $12.60 per hour paid by CoreCivic. The State of Mississippi also offers its correctional officers more generous wages and paid time off than CoreCivic. Furthermore, the BOP offers new correctional officers noncompetitive promotion potential to $26.91 an hour, while CoreCivic pays correctional officers, throughout their careers, only the required prevailing wage rates set forth by the Department of Labor's Service Contract Act wage determinations. The BOP's contract with CoreCivic does not address either correctional officer qualification requirements or staff pay and benefits. We believe the BOP should evaluate the extent to which employee qualification levels and turnover rates impact safety and security concerns, and whether its contractual terms should be modified to address those concerns. In addition, while the BOP's solicitation that resulted in the Adams County contract required companies to develop a staffing plan that would illustrate the "total number of full-time equivalents (FTE) for each position title," based on our discussions with BOP and CoreCivic officials, it became apparent that the contract was vague about how staffing levels should be calculated. A 2011 contract modification provided that staffing levels should not fall below a monthly average of 90 percent for Correctional Services and 85 percent for Health Services of the BOP-approved staffing plan. Both the BOP and CoreCivic told us they interpreted the contract to allow the calculation of staffing levels to be based on headcounts rather than FTE, and leave the determination of day-to-day staff assignments to the discretion of CoreCivic. As a result, we found the staffing levels CoreCivic reported to the BOP reflected neither actual staffing at the facility nor staffing insufficiencies. Specifically, CoreCivic reported to the BOP simple headcounts of staff recorded on payroll records, regardless of the hours each employee actually worked. When we re-calculated correctional services staffing levels based on FTEs using time and attendance records, we found that, throughout the 4-year period we reviewed, staffing levels were lower than the levels represented by CoreCivic's headcounts and were frequently lower than the BOP's minimum staffing threshold. We found similar issues regarding CoreCivic's reporting of health services staffing. Because the BOP was unaware of these staffing insufficiencies, it was unable to assess the adequacy of staffing levels at the facility. When we reported these issues and our concerns about them to BOP officials, they told us CoreCivic's reporting was consistent with the contract. We found that had the contract clearly specified that staffing levels should be measured using FTEs, between July 2011 and July 2015 the BOP could have taken $1,927,307 in invoice deductions as a result of inadequate correctional and health services staffing levels. We believe this nearly $2 million that the BOP expended could have been avoided with more precise contract language and was wasteful. We also found that, beginning in December 2012, CoreCivic excluded from its required staffing reports the status of five critical health services positions identified in the approved staffing plan, namely two dentists, two physicians, and one advanced registered nurse practitioner. As a result, the BOP, which was not notified of and did not identify the change, was unable to assess the effect of any vacancies on service provision or invoice amounts. We believe that this gap in oversight had a negative effect on CoreCivic's ability to provide quality health care at the Adams County facility. In fact, we found that between December 2012 and September 2015, the Adams County facility was staffed with only a single physician for 434 days (43 percent of the time) and a single dentist for 689 days (69 percent of the time), resulting in inmate-to-provider ratios that were about double those specified in BOP program statements. Finally, we found several aspects of the BOP's control and oversight of the contract performance to be inadequate. The BOP structured this contract as a performance-based acquisition, for which the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires a performance work statement, measurable performance standards, and a method of assessing contractor performance against those standards. However, the BOP did not implement appropriate performance standards to measure and evaluate CoreCivic's performance. For example, the BOP's oversight of staffing levels is limited because the contract requirements do not sufficiently specify how CoreCivic should measure and report facility staffing levels. We also found CoreCivic inconsistently used industry-standard dietary guidelines to evaluate the nutritional adequacy of food service offerings at the facility, an issue that may have been avoided had the contract specified which standards CoreCivic should have followed. Additionally, the BOP's oversight of billings was inadequate in several ways, resulting in the BOP failing to identify instances where CoreCivic did not apply mandatory invoice deductions. In August 2016, the Deputy Attorney General directed the BOP to begin reducing, and ultimately end, its use of privately operated prisons. Because this order was issued after the close of our audit period, any analysis of its basis or effect were outside of this audit's scope. This report makes 9 recommendations to assist the BOP in improving operations under the Adams County contract and in addressing $42,300 we have identified as questioned costs. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2016. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Shelf Number: 145091 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal Bureau of PrisonsFederal PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the United States Marshals Service Contrast No. DJJODT7C0002 with CoreCivic, Inc., to Operate the Leavenworth Detention Center Leavenworth, Kansas Summary: In January 2007, the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT) awarded, on behalf of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), contract no. DJJODT7C0002 to Corrections Corporation of America, now known as CoreCivic, Inc. (CoreCivic), to provide comprehensive detention services at the Leavenworth Detention Center (LDC) in Leavenworth, Kansas. This contract is a sole-source acquisition that includes a 5-year base period with three 5-year option periods and has a total estimated value of $697 million. Actual contract costs through January 2017 were $252 million. The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to assess USMS's and CoreCivic's administration of, and compliance with, contract terms and conditions in the areas of: (1) contract management, oversight, and monitoring; (2) staffing requirements; and (3) billings and payments. The audit time frame focused on, but was not limited to, October 2010 through May 2015. As an initial matter, we determined that the OFDT's justification for issuing a sole source contract did not include all of the language and supporting documentation required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Additionally, the USMS was unable to provide evidence, as required by the FAR, that the OFDT obtained competition to the maximum extent practicable and ensured the best overall value to the government. Specifically, the OFDT restricted contract performance to the city of Leavenworth, thus potentially limiting the pool of offerors, but it could not provide the required evidence that it had a sufficient justification for this restriction. We also concluded that the USMS failed to provide sufficient oversight of the LDC and that this failure resulted in several significant issues with LDC operations going unaddressed for extended periods of time. In our judgment, the USMS was inherently reactive: instead of actively monitoring LDC operations to identify discrepancies and thwart potential incidents, the USMS often became aware of incidents after they occurred. Of particular concern, the USMS Contracting Officer's Representative (COR), who was responsible for monitoring CoreCivic's performance at the LDC on a day-to-day basis, was located offsite, had no previous contract oversight experience, and received no formal guidance and negligible detention-related training. The COR maintained an infrequent onsite presence at the LDC, did not document the inspection activities performed, and did not develop an inspection program or monitoring procedures. Furthermore, in our judgment, the USMS's lack of effective continuous monitoring at the LDC presents risks that may extend throughout all its other contract detention facilities. Upon learning of these potentially systemic weaknesses in the USMS's contract oversight, the OIG issued a Management Advisory Memorandum to the USMS so it could take immediate action to address them. In response, USMS officials stated that their goal was to improve contract monitoring by establishing an onsite detention contract monitoring program at all private detention facilities. This program would be staffed by full-time professional Contract Administrators under the supervision of the USMS's Prisoner Operations Division. The OIG Memorandum and the USMS's responses to it are detailed in the body of this report and attached as appendices. Insufficient oversight by the USMS allowed several problems at the LDC to persist over a significant period of time. Among the issues affecting the safety and security of the LDC that we identified was its periodic under-staffing. We found that from October 2012 through September 2014, the LDC's staffing was generally consistent with the facility-wide staffing plan thresholds. However, from October 2014 through September 2015, the LDC's staffing levels deteriorated and the facility-wide average vacancy rate more than doubled to 11 percent. This was primarily driven by correctional officer vacancies, which reached as high as 23 percent. These correctional officer vacancies led to several problems in 2015, including the LDC's long-term use of mandatory overtime, which LDC personnel said led to lower morale, security concerns, and fewer correctional officers available to escort medical staff and detainees to and from the health services unit. LDC's vacancies led to the closure of security posts and reassignment of personnel, sometimes to the detriment of detainee services. Many of the closures occurred at posts that had been designated by CoreCivic as "mandatory," meaning they were required to be filled on each shift in order to run the facility in a safe and secure manner. The problem of post closures was especially acute from February 1 through March 31, 2015. During this period, the LDC closed at least one security post in all 118 shifts and closed an average of 7 posts per shift. LDC's vacancies also led to Unit Management personnel being assigned to security posts instead of performing their normal job duties, which included assisting detainees with casework and transitional services, developing individual detainee program plans, and delivering services and programs to detainees, among other duties. Rather than take steps to address understaffing, both USMS and CoreCivic took actions that exacerbated the problem. For example, CoreCivic did not utilize all available staffing options to remedy the under-staffing problem, such as by requesting temporary staff from other CoreCivic facilities. In fact, during a period when the LDC was understaffed, CoreCivic temporarily transferred LDC personnel to other CoreCivic facilities, which in one instance led to a significant reduction in the size of the LDC's already shorthanded Special Operations Response Team, weakening its ability to operate effectively and fulfill its mission in the event of a significant incident. We also found that the USMS allowed CoreCivic to contract with a local government to house non-federal detainees at the LDC - at a rate below that being paid by the USMS - without considering the staffing implications of the arrangement. We also learned during our audit that, unbeknownst to the USMS, LDC officials had uninstalled beds prior to an American Correctional Association (ACA) inspection in 2011 in order to conceal from ACA that the LDC was triple bunking detainees. Following the OIG's discovery of this issue, CoreCivic conducted an internal investigation, which revealed that similar conduct may have occurred prior to the 2005 and 2008 ACA audits and that a former CoreCivic divisional Managing Director was aware of these efforts. CoreCivic told the OIG that in response to this finding, its Ethics & Compliance office instituted an ethics liaison program and completed training at LDC on employees' duty to report misconduct, options for reporting misconduct, and CoreCivic's non-retaliation policy for employees who report misconduct. We were informed by ACA that it had decided not to take any action against CoreCivic, in part because the senior officials involved were no longer with CoreCivic. Our audit further determined that the USMS has issued conflicting guidance on the allowability of triple bunking by its contractors, and that it should clearly specify in its new and existing contracts the rules and procedures governing this practice. Additionally, we found that the USMS did not detect several weaknesses in CoreCivic's contractually-required quality control program at the LDC, which our review determined had significant shortcomings. For example, the LDC Quality Assurance Manager received minimal instruction and guidance on how to conduct facility reviews; there was insufficient evidence proving that the LDC inspection review steps were conducted; the LDC's plans of action did not properly address deficiencies and did not provide viable long term correction; and the LDC had insufficient evidence proving that plans of action were implemented. Despite the LDC's staffing deficiencies and the other instances of non-compliance with contract requirements, we determined that the USMS had not used available contractual mechanisms to hold CoreCivic accountable. According to the contract and USMS policy, the USMS may issue contract price reductions for contractors' significant or repeat deficiencies, failure to fill essential staff positions, and having an unacceptable number of vacancies. Yet we found that, from March 2006 through January 2017, the USMS had not proposed or issued any contract price reductions for any of its 15 contract detention facilities, including the LDC. We further found that the COR for the LDC contract had never seen the USMS's price reduction guidance, and USMS officials were unable to provide us with evidence that such guidance was sent to any of the current USMS District CORs responsible for the other 14 USMS contract detention facilities. Additionally, the USMS was not entering contractor past performance evaluations into the government-wide electronic evaluation reporting system, as required by the FAR, or conducting Performance Evaluation Meetings as required by the contract. Finally, the OIG determined that one of CoreCivic's employee fringe benefits called the "sick account" contained excess funds that could be interpreted as "cash equivalents" that should have been paid to employees on a regular basis. Because CoreCivic's benefits administrator withheld these funds for months or years before disbursement to employees, it is questionable whether the sick account is compliant with applicable labor standards for federal service contracts. We believe the USMS should work with the Department of Labor, and as necessary CoreCivic, to address the issue. CoreCivic also improperly requested - and the USMS improperly paid - $103,271 in salaries and benefits for commissary positions not funded through the LDC contract. These unallowable payments have a compounding effect over time because they are incorporated into each monthly invoice until the contract ends. In March 2017, the USMS issued a contract modification to CoreCivic to recover the unallowable price adjustments and to modify the Monthly Operating Price to reflect the proper monthly price. This report makes 24 recommendations to assist the USMS in improving contractor operations and enhancing the USMS's monitoring and oversight at the LDC. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2017. 129p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 17-22: Accessed January 28, 2017 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1722.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1722.pdf Shelf Number: 145186 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Wassenaar, Mattheus Title: Public vs. Nonprofit Incarceration: The Case of the Netherlands Summary: Outsourcing of detention is a complex public task, due to quality risks from incomplete contracts, the public responsibility for sentencing and execution, and related social opinions. In the Netherlands, the debate about the outsourcing of prison services to the private profit sector has recently restarted. At the same time, in the Netherlands there is extensive experience of outsourcing prison services - in particular for juvenile detention and internal forensic psychiatric care - to nonprofit organizations. In the Dutch experience, we have not found differences between public and nonprofit execution, with respect to the type of contract with the prisons, costs and quality. The Dutch experience shows that outsourcing to nonprofit entrepreneurs in civil society can be an alternative to outsourcing to the private market. Details: Tinbergen: Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam, 2017. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2017-023/VIII: Accessed May 10, 2017 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920440 Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920440 Shelf Number: 145389 Keywords: Detention FacilitiesPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Small, Mary Title: A Toxic Relationship: Private Prisons and U.S. Immigration Detention Summary: A new report, A Toxic Relationship: Private Prisons and U.S. Immigration Detention, by Detention Watch Network (DWN) builds on the overwhelming evidence that the privatization of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention exacerbates due process violations, egregious conditions and transparency concerns that are endemic to the immigration detention system. In addition, the report amplifies the experiences of 42 individuals who were or are held in privately-run detention centers. The report comes as the Homeland Security Advisory Council subcommittee presents its findings later today from an investigation into the use of private prisons for ICE detention. Regardless of the subcommittee's findings, A Toxic Relationship shows that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) secretary, Jeh Johnson already has the evidence he needs to severe ties with private prison companies, a crucial step that the Department of Justice announced it is taking earlier this year. Over 73 percent of immigrants held in ICE custody are incarcerated in facilities operated by private companies. The two largest and most notorious companies, The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO) and Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which is currently attempting a re-brand, have well documented track records of abuse, mismanagement and neglect. Both companies are heavily lobbying the federal government in the hopes of increasing their bottom line as detention numbers climb to over 40,000 people behind bars. In 2015, CCA and GEO received $765 million for immigration detention - more than double the $307 million they received in 2008. The report details four fundamental problems with the use of privately-run detention centers, as our research indicates that private contractors: Seek to maximize profits by cutting costs -- and subsequently critical services -- at the expense of people's health, safety and overall well-being; Are not accountable, and often do not bear any consequences when they fail to meet the terms of their contracts; Exert undue influence over government officials, and push to maintain and expand the immigration detention system; Are not transparent, and in fact, fight hard to obscure the details of their contracts and operations from the American public. The issues of cost-cutting and indifference towards immigrant lives was reaffirmed just this week as news broke of two more deaths at privately-run detention centers over Thanksgiving weekend, bringing this year's total to 12. Raquel Calderon de Hildago died at the CCA operated Eloy Detention Center in Arizona on November 27th and Esmerio Campos died at the GEO operated South Texas Detention Complex (Pearsall) in Texas on November 25th. Recent investigations into deaths in immigration detention have found that inadequate medical care at detention centers has contributed to numerous deaths, and shine a particular spotlight on Eloy - the deadliest detention center in the country. The lack of transparency is clearly demonstrated by DWN and the Center for Constitutional Rights' ongoing Freedom of Information Lawsuit with the federal government. In July, a federal judge ruled that under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the government must release details of its contracts with private prison companies. The government chose not to appeal, but the private prison companies intervened to stop the release and filed an appeal of their own. This latest tactic by GEO and CCA to obscure the details of their contracts and operations from the American public demonstrates the dangerous degree to which they feel entitled to influence the government and block public's right to know what their government is doing. Details: Washington, DC: Detention Watch Network, 2016. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/A%20Toxic%20Relationship_DWN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/default/files/reports/A%20Toxic%20Relationship_DWN.pdf Shelf Number: 145811 Keywords: Detention CentersImmigrant DetentionImmigration EnforcementPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Fitzharris, Andy Title: Chief Inspector's Report into the "Circumstances surrounding organised prisoner (Fight Club) and access to cell phones and contraband at Mount Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) Summary: Mount Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) is one of two prisons in New Zealand managed by private operators Serco New Zealand Ltd (Serco). Since August 2011, MECF has been the largest remand facility in the country, and is designed to hold up to 976 males of remand accused, remand convicted and sentenced status. On 15 July 2015 the Department of Corrections (Corrections) became aware that a series of video clips showing organised fighting between prisoners at MECF had been uploaded to the website YouTube. The videos (the YouTube Footage) provide irrefutable evidence of the existence of a 'fight club' operating at MECF. On 17 July 2015 TV3 News screened footage that had been uploaded to YouTube, showing a number of prisoners involved in organised fighting at MECF. Over the following days a number of prisoners, ex-prisoners and their families, came forth with accounts of organised fighting, prisoner on prisoner violence and inhumane treatment during their time at MECF. The videos uploaded to YouTube had been filmed on contraband cell phones, which raised concerns over prisoner access to cell phones and other contraband on to the site. An internal investigation is being completed by Serco, which holds the Prison Management Contract for MECF (the Contract). As at the date of this report (Report), Serco's internal report is yet to be provided to Corrections. By Terms of Reference dated 27 August 2015 (the Terms of Reference). I was instructed by the Chief Executive of Corrections (the Chief Executive) to conduct a full investigation (the Investigation) into: a) the possible existence of a 'fight club' at MECF; and b) access of prisoners to contraband, in particular cell phones, at MECF. The Terms of Reference superseded an earlier terms of reference dated 19 July 2015 (the Earlier Terms of Reference), which instructed me to pay particular attention to the three months prior to that date. Therefore, the Investigation has a particular focus on, but is not limited to, the three months to the date of the Earlier Terms of Reference. The Corrections Inspectorate (Inspectorate) operates under the Corrections Act 2004, the Corrections Regulations 2005, the mandate of the Chief Executive, and the policies established by the Department relating to the fair, safe, secure and humane treatment of prisoners and those detained within the corrections system. This Report contains Phase One of the Investigation required by the Terms of Reference. Phase Two will consist of a review of the adequacy of controls designed to address prisoner violence and access to cell phones operating in other New Zealand prisons, and an investigation into any reported incidents of prisoner on prisoner fighting recorded on cell phones in other New Zealand prisons. Details: Wellington, NZ: Department of Corrections, 2016. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2017 at: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/856650/Phase_One_MECF_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Year: 2016 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/856650/Phase_One_MECF_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Shelf Number: 147624 Keywords: Prison AdministrationPrison ContrabandPrison ViolencePrisoner MisconductPrivate Prisons |
Author: Andrew, Jane Title: Prison Privatisation in Australia: The State of the Nation Summary: Australia now imprisons more people than at any point in its history. As of June 2015, 36,134 people were incarcerated across eight states, and the national imprisonment rate stood at 196 prisoners per 100,000 people. The total annual net cost of Australia's prison system stands at $3.4 billion. As a result of the growth in prisoner numbers and a variety of pressures on the sector, state governments continue to look for new ways to deliver prison services that are thought to be both socially and fiscally responsible, including various forms of privatisation. Prison privatisations have been justified on a number of grounds. The first examination of prison privatisation in Australia, made through the Kennedy report of 1988, asserted that 'In some particular areas the private sector can do it cheaper and better' (Kennedy, 1988: 88). Subsequently, in 2009 the New South Wales General Purpose Standing Committee 'Inquiry into the Privatization of Prisons and Prison Related Services' concluded that' the private management of prisons will also likely produce greater cost savings and efficiencies than if they were to remain in the public system' (GPSC-NSW, 2009: 51). Similarly, in 2013 the Queensland Commission of Audit (QCA) claimed that ' greater efficiencies can be achieved by private operation of correctional facilities'. Equally, the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA), in a 2015 report on Western Australian prisons, remarked that ' private prisons are held to higher standards of accountability and transparency than public prisons'. Accordingly, privatisation has been mooted as a way of providing prison services with greater performance, lower cost, better efficiency and stronger accountability but in reality, little is known about the consequences of privatisation and whether or not they deliver these benefits to the community. Private prisons now incarcerate 18.5% of the prison population of Australia (Productivity Commission, 2014: Table 8A.1), and clearly play a large part in the functioning of the custodial system in Australia. In fact, Australia has the highest rate of private incarceration per capita of any country in the world (Mason, 2013: 2). Out of a total of 101 prisons in Australia, private contractors operate nine facilities in five different states: two prisons in Queensland, two in New South Wales, one in South Australia, two in Victoria and two in Western Australia. Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory do not have private prisons and are therefore outside the scope of this report. Parklea (NSW), Arthur Gorrie (QLD) and Mount Gambier (SA) prisons all deal with remand prisoners. Port Phillip (VIC) and Parklea (NSW) both take maximum security prisoners. The remaining facilities house medium- and low-security prisoners, and do not take part in remand activity. As of 2015, there are only three private contractors responsible for managing custodial services in Australia. These are GEO Group (GEO), G4S and Serco. Private prisons are now responsible for over 6,000 Australian prisoners (Productivity Commission, 2014: Table 8A.1), and absorb a considerable amount of taxpayer money nationally. Despite this, research into private prisons in Australia is extremely limited. Indeed, there has been no single publication or study in the last ten years that has covered all of Australia's private prisons in detail. The present report aims to deliver such a review and in doing so demonstrates that not only do privately managed prisons across Australia vary greatly in terms of their accountability, costs, performance and efficiency, but also that it is very difficult to assess these criteria because of a general lack of transparency. This comprehensive report of the sector seeks to address this information gap and, as a result, intends to better inform future public debate on prison privatisation. The purpose of this report is to provide a description of Australian private prisons as they have evolved across the country. Our overview of private prisons in Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia will give an understanding of the 'State of the Nation' with regard to prison privatisation and its impact. As stated, our study considers private prisons in Australia against four key categories: accountability, costs, performance and efficiency. Details: Sydney: University of Sydney Business School, 2016. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 11, 2017 at: https://sydney.edu.au/business/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/269972/Prison_Privatisation_in_Australia-_The_State_of_the_Nation_June_2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: https://sydney.edu.au/business/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/269972/Prison_Privatisation_in_Australia-_The_State_of_the_Nation_June_2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147660 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationCosts of CorrectionsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Fitzharris, Andy Title: Chief Inspector's Phase Two Report into: Circumstances surrounding organised prisoner on prisoner fighting (Fight Club) and access to cell phone contraband in New Zealand prisons other than Mount Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) Summary: We analysed a total of 655 PPV incidents for the four month period 1 April 2015 to 31 July 2015 and there was no evidence that organised prisoner fighting was happening at any of the eight Corrections Services prisons we visited. There were four incidents involving prisoner sparring and conditioning reported by two prisons and these could be considered as a forerunner of organised prisoner fighting. On each occasion they were quickly identified and staff responded promptly to prevent them escalating. We recognise that there will always be elements of assaults and fighting by prisoners, and it's not always easy to prevent violent incidents from happening, even when staff are observing prisoners first hand. There were good levels of prisoner supervision apparent at each prison and recurring evidence from incident reports and interviews that staff responses are timely as soon as they became aware of situations that required their intervention. Active management of prisoners and prompt action taken by staff clearly presents as the most effective preventive control to mitigate risks of PPV situations developing into more serious incidents. There are a range of Violence Reduction Strategies in various stages of implementation across each prison. Most have been established since the 'fight club' events surfaced at MECF and present as good practice in terms of controls for PPV. We noted that prisoner access to physical training equipment has been restricted as a control at some prisons to limit options for conditioning. The extent of these restrictions needs to be balanced against reasonable access to exercise equipment for prisoner well-being. Prisoners are entitled to have access to exercise equipment however their fitness activities should be closely supervised to ensure conditioning and sparring is not happening. We were frustrated with the poor quality of incident reporting in IOMS relating to PPV and contraband cell phones. The incident reporting system is cumbersome and component categories require review to be made more user-friendly. In some cases, PPV incidents are being reported under the non-notifiable category of 'Fighting' rather than 'Assault, non-serious or Assault, no injury'. We could not confirm how widespread this practice was and suggest Corrections Services conduct a further review of incident reporting categories to determine and clarify business requirements. The capability for prison management to effectively implement gang management strategies may be compromised by inaccurate data in IOMS about individual prisoner gang membership/affiliations. This data needs to be cleaned up so that gang information on IOMS is current and reliable. Details: Wellington, NZ: Department of Corrections, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2017 at: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/856652/Phase_Two_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Year: 2016 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/856652/Phase_Two_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Shelf Number: 148278 Keywords: Prison AdministrationPrison ContrabandPrison GangsPrison ViolencePrisoner MisconductPrivate Prisons |
Author: Victorian Auditor-General Title: Safety and Cost Effectiveness of Private Prisons Summary: Private prisons accommodate around one third of the state's male prison population. The safe, secure and cost effective operation of these prisons is essential for the effective functioning of Victoria's corrections system and for community safety. Like the broader prison system, private prisons face significant challenges. The male prison population has increased by approximately 50 per cent over the last seven years, primarily driven by an increase in remand prisoners. This audit examines whether two of Victoria's private prisons-Port Phillip Prison and Fulham Correctional Centre-are safe and cost effective. We looked at: private prisons' management of critical safety and security risks private prisons' performance against key service delivery measures, costs and risk transfer expectations under the original contracts the process for the recent contract extensions and whether they delivered value for money. This is the first audit in which we used our 'follow-the-dollar' powers, directly engaging the private prison operators and requesting information from them. We made six recommendations for DJR, and two for the Department of Treasury and Finance related to its role in the private prison contract extension process Details: Melbourne: Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 2018. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2018 at: https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-03/20180328-Private-Prisons.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Australia URL: https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-03/20180328-Private-Prisons.pdf Shelf Number: 149742 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationCost EffectivenessCosts of CorrectionsPrison AdministrationPrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatizations |
Author: Mitchell, Matthew Title: The Pros of Privately-Housed Cons: New Evidence on the Cost Savings of Private Prisons Summary: Three-fifths of all U.S. states contract with private corporations to house a portion of their state prisoners. A host of studies have analyzed the cost of incarceration in many of these prisons. This study takes a broader approach. It compares state per-prisoner department of corrections budgets across 46 states. Accounting for a number of cost factors, significant perprisoner savings were found in states that house a portion of their prisoners privately. All other factors being equal, states such as New Mexico with forty-five percent of their prisoners in private custody spent about $9,660 less per-prisoner in 2001 than non-privatized states. Given New Mexico's prison population of 5,300 this is an annual savings of $51 million. Forty-five percent privatization is expected to reduce the typical department of corrections budget by about one-third. The paper begins with a short history of the privatization movement and a discussion of the motivation to privatize. Details: Tijeras, NM: Rio Grande Foundations, 2003. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2018 at: https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/12247.pdf Year: 2003 Country: United States URL: https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/publications/12247.pdf Shelf Number: 150057 Keywords: Costs of CorrectionsCosts of PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Papageorgiou, Ioannis V. Title: Explaining the asynchronies in the introduction of prison privatisation in England and Wales: A structural Marxist approach Summary: he expansion of prison privatisation presents distinctive traits. One of them is its peculiar temporal expansion in a comparative point of view. This research focuses on the intrastate temporal expansion and more specifically in the case of England and Wales. What is researched is the reason behind the delay in the emergence of prison privatisation, in other words the asynchrony between the introduction of general and prison privatisation policies. This Thesis rejects explanatory frameworks based on historical analogies, pragmatic concerns or economic arguments and puts the explanation in a discourse of political interaction. In this framework, previous approaches related to the concept of globalisation, commodification of citizenry and political culture do not provide either suitable analytical tools in explaining the asynchrony in question. This research, instead, aims to bring forward the class struggle as catalytic agent in criminal justice system developments using a Structural Marxist concept of the State and its transformations. In the Capitalist Mode of Production the State acquires a unifying role among the contradicting classes by promoting the supposed general interest of the society, in order to allow the continuation of class domination and labour exploitation. This is feasible through the constantly unfolding hegemonic strategy which organizes the cohesion of the power bloc and disorganizes the dominated classes. Hegemonic strategy substantiates in the State Apparatuses which is not just a tool for policy making but rather a point where contradicting class powers condense; policy formation as such reflects the vector of class power in the apparatuses. Hegemonic strategy is set in motion by the State Personnel which is relatively independent knot in the transmission of domination between the power bloc and the dominated classes. State transformations are indications of this strategy since they inscribe in the structure of the State the vector of the class struggle. Hegemonic strategy took interesting contours after the mid-'60s. The capital over-accumulation crisis on the one hand and on the other Authoritarian Statism promoted extensive State transformations as in the case of privatisations. Massive reactions, however, caused by the labour movement, required their containment and consequently a smoothly operating criminal justice system. The entrenchment of prison officers, therefore, from the wider changes in the labour status became crucial and a state transformation in itself, although by absence. This explains the delay of prison privatisation which appears indeed at the end of a long socially unstable period. Details: Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2013. 367p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 24, 2018 at: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/7804/Papageorgiou2013.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/7804/Papageorgiou2013.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 150349 Keywords: Private PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Sentencing Project Title: Private Prisons in the United States Summary: Private prisons in the United States incarcerated 128,063 people in 2016, representing 8.5% of the total state and federal prison population. Since 2000, the number of people housed in private prisons has increased 47%. States show significant variation in their use of private correctional facilities. For example, New Mexico incarcerates over 40% of its prison population in private facilities, while 23 states do not employ any for-profit prisons. Data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and interviews with corrections officials find that in 2016, 27 states and the federal government incarcerated people in private facilities run by corporations including GEO Group, Core Civic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America), and Management and Training Corporation. According to BJS data, 19 of the states with private prison contracts incarcerate more than 500 people in for-profit prisons. Texas, the first state to adopt private prisons in 1985, incarcerated the largest number of people under state jurisdiction, 13,692. Since 2000, the number of people in private prisons has increased 47%, compared to an overall rise in the prison population of 9%. In six states, the private prison population has more than doubled during this period. The federal prison system experienced a 120% increase in use of private prisons since 2000, reaching 34,159 people in private facilities in 2016. Among the immigrant detention population, 26,249 people - 73% of the detained population - were confined in privately run facilities in 2017. The private immigrant population grew 442% since 2002. The private prison population reached its peak in 2012 with 137,220 people. The population then declined for three years before increasing again in 2016. At the federal level, a 2016 Obama Administration policy shift to reduce reliance and ultimately phase out private prison contracts was reversed by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in February 2017. The reversal took place despite significant declines in the federal prison population and a scathing report by the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General that found federally contracted prisons had more safety and security incidents than public prisons. Currently, the federal Bureau of Prisons maintains the nation's highest number of people managed under private prison custody. Changes in policy at the Department of Justice in 2017 that are likely to increase sentence length and expand prosecutions for drug and immigration offenses may contribute to the expansion of private facility contracting. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2018. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 8, 2018 at: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Private-Prisons-in-the-United-States.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Private-Prisons-in-the-United-States.pdf Shelf Number: 151062 Keywords: PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Highsmith, Brian Title: Commercialized (In)Justice: Consumer Abuses in the Bail and Corrections Industry Summary: This National Consumer Law Center report examines the growing problem of consumer abuses by private companies profiting from the U.S. criminal legal system and mass incarceration, disproportionately affecting people of color and low-income people, and makes recommendations for reform. This report discusses the growing problem of "commercialized injustice"-consumer abuses perpetuated by companies profiting from the criminal legal system and mass incarceration. Although not always visible to people who do not live in heavily-policed communities or who are protected by other forms of privilege, the scale of private industry's involvement in the contemporary criminal legal system is staggering. These companies provide a wide range of products and services, and operate in various relationships with the government. Some contract directly with governments (e.g., private probation and prison phone services). Others sell directly to consumers, but under specific authority to administer criminal legal functions (e.g., commercial bail and certain rehabilitation and diversion programs). And others simply profit from the contours of our modern criminal legal system (e.g., pre-arrest diversion programs that contract with private retailers). The expanding reach of the modern corrections industry represents the intersection of two troubling trends: (1) the outsourcing of the criminal legal system to the private sector, exemplified by the growth of the private prison industry; and (2) the imposition of fines and fees on mostly low-income defendants to fund the criminal legal system. States and local governments are outsourcing various core functions of their criminal legal systems-traditionally public services-to private corporations operating to maximize profit for their owners. At the same time, they have sought to shift the cost of operating the criminal legal system onto those who have contact with the system and their loved ones, particularly through the assessment of fines and fees on those accused of criminal activity. The corrections industry's growth exacerbates these trends, combining the conflicts of interest endemic in so-called "user-funded" financing structures with the lack of public accountability that advocates have long criticized in the private prison context. Every industry discussed in this report shares this common feature: each profits from financial extractions from individuals based on their exposure to the criminal legal system. The growth of the corrections industry accelerates the trend whereby the costs of our legal system are imposed on low-income, disadvantaged communities least able to shoulder such burdens, rather than shared as a collective public responsibility. The corrections industry operates for the primary purpose of maximizing profits for its owners-creating strong incentives to achieve new forms of monetary extraction in addition to shifting the burden of existing costs. Details: Boston: National Consumer Law Center, 2019. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2019 at: https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/report-commercialized-injustice.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/criminal-justice/report-commercialized-injustice.pdf Shelf Number: 155462 Keywords: Bail IndustryConsumer AbusesCorrectionsPrisonsPrivate IndustryPrivate Legal SystemPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |